Introduction
This article concerns the proposed settlement reached between the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division (“DoJ”) and Greystar Management Services LLC (“Greystar”) regarding alleged anticompetitive coordination in the multifamily rental housing market using RealPage's revenue management software. According to the DoJ's complaint, Greystar and other large property managers exchanged competitively sensitive information via the software and related communications, which allegedly reduced independent pricing decisions. The proposed Final Judgment, agreed without admission of liability, imposes a series of behavioural commitments and compliance measures aimed at preventing similar conduct and mitigating potential competitive harm. These commitments address both the technical configuration of revenue management tools and the flow of competitively sensitive information between market participants.
1. Case Context
The DoJ alleged that RealPage's revenue management products were used by Greystar and other landlords to share property-specific nonpublic data — including executed rents, concessions, occupancy levels, and pricing strategies — in a manner that allowed alignment of rental prices across competitors. These exchanges occurred not only through algorithmic processes but also through participation in RealPage-organised meetings and other direct communications. The conduct was alleged to constitute an unlawful agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Commitment Measures
Under the settlement, Greystar is prohibited from licensing or using any revenue management product that relies on external non-public data to generate rental prices or recommendations for its properties, shares such non-public data with unrelated property owners or managers, pools data from properties under different ownership, or incorporates models trained on competitors' nonpublic data. Products embedding rental price floors or limiting price decreases based on competitors' data are similarly prohibited, and Greystar may not agree with other property owners or managers to use a particular revenue management product.
The settlement also imposes a comprehensive ban on the exchange
of competitively sensitive information with competitors. This
includes prohibitions on both the disclosure and solicitation of
nonpublic data, regardless of the method of communication. The
restriction applies to all forms of contact — such as market
surveys, phone calls, messaging platforms, shared online documents,
and participation in industry forums. In line with this approach,
Greystar is barred from attending or participating in RealPage
steering committees, subcommittees, user groups, or similar events,
with any inadvertent participation requiring notification to the
DoJ within 30 days, accompanied by full documentation.
To ensure compliance, Greystar must obtain written certification
from vendors confirming that any revenue management product used
meets the settlement's restrictions. Where noncompliant
products are used after April 1, 2026, or if violations occur, the
court may appoint an independent monitor with broad powers to
oversee implementation. Internally, Greystar is required to adopt a
DoJ-approved antitrust compliance policy within 30 days of the
court's order, provide annual training to relevant employees,
and designate a compliance officer whose appointment is subject to
DoJ approval. Annual compliance certifications must be provided by
senior legal officers and revenue management personnel.
Finally, Greystar has committed to ongoing cooperation with the
DoJ in connection with related investigations and litigation,
including making employees available for interviews, producing
relevant documents, and providing testimony when required. This
cooperation obligation is intended to facilitate enforcement
efforts not only against Greystar but also against other parties
involved in similar conduct.
Conclusion
The commitments in the Greystar's proposed settlement reflect a targeted approach to addressing the antitrust risks associated with algorithmic pricing systems. By imposing restrictions on both the technical functionality of revenue management tools and the sharing of competitively sensitive information, the settlement aims to restore independent price-setting in the rental housing market. The case illustrates the increasing regulatory scrutiny over data-driven pricing tools and sets a precedent for how behavioral remedies can be structured to address algorithm-enabled coordination.
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