Noel Clarke vs The Guardian: Key Legal Lessons

The libel case of Noel Clarke -v- The Guardian has sparked widespread discussion about the boundaries of truth, and investigative journalism and the public interest defence, in the context of defamation. This article sets out the chronology of the proceedings and explores the key legal and media lessons from Mr Clarke's failed £70 million libel case against The Guardian. For legal professionals and PR strategists alike, these proceedings offer key insights into how courts assess defamation claims when faced with robust defences.

Background

In March 2021, the British Academy of Film, Television and the Arts announced that it intended to give an award to Noel Clarke, the actor best known for his roles in "The Hood Trilogy" or Doctor Who. In April 2021, Mr Clarke received that award. Shortly thereafter, however, an article was published by The Guardian with the title "Harassment, naked auditions and Bafta's highest accolade" in the printed edition of the paper and "'Sexual predator': actor Noel Clarke accused of groping, harassment and bullying by 20 women" in the online article. The article reported that Mr Clarke denied the allegations.

Following the article, the British Academy of Film, Television and the Arts released a statement confirming that it had "immediately suspended the award and Noel Clarke's membership of Bafta until further notice." The Guardian posted seven further articles following this statement.

Mr Clarke issued proceedings in libel and breach of the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA") against Guardian News & Media Limited ("GNM") in April 2022, on the date that the limitation period was due to expire for the claim, seeking an injunction and damages in excess of £10m.

Hearing on Meaning

As is customary in defamation proceedings, there was a trial of preliminary issues in October 2023 to determine the meaning of the complained of articles. Focusing on the meaning of the first article only (for reasons which follow), Mr Justice Johnson considered the meaning to be as follows:¹

"There are strong grounds to believe that the claimant is a serial abuser of women, that he has, over 15 years, used his power to prey on and harass and sometimes bully female colleagues, that he has engaged in unwanted sexual contact, kissing, touching or groping, sexually inappropriate behaviour and comments, and professional misconduct, taking and sharing explicit pictures and videos without consent, including secretly filming a young actor's naked audition."

In coming to this conclusion, Mr Justice Johnson rejected Mr Clarke's contention that the articles conveyed the highest level of defamatory meaning: that he was guilty of sexual misconduct (i.e. a Chase² level 1 meaning).

Application to strike out GNM's Defence

Mr Clarke applied in December 2024 to strike out GNM's Defence entirely, alternatively only in relation to GNM's public interest defence. In support of this application, Mr Clarke first applied to cross-examine GNM's Head of Investigations, Paul Lewis, during the hearing of the strike out application. In deciding whether to grant this preliminary application, Mrs Justice Steyn observed that "oral interrogation of an opposing party prior to trial is an exceptional measure".³ Mrs Justice Steyn was undeterred by Mr Clarke's allegations that Mr Lewis had perverted the course of justice by either deleting or fabricating evidence, and concluded that "the application for permission to cross-examine Mr. Lewis on this strike out application must be rejected" as the allegation was "not a discrete issue unconnected to the matters on which Mr. Lewis is due to be cross-examined at trial in a few weeks' time."⁴

Concerning the substantive application to strike out GNM's Defence, Mrs Justice Steyn explained that the courts would only strike out a claim if the document destruction amounted to a perversion of the course of justice and the destruction prevented a fair trial from being possible. Whilst GNM had deleted some documents, Mrs Justice Steyn contextualised the deletion as being before proceedings were even contemplated and, in any event, she was "unpersuaded that the deletion of documents... had a tendency to pervert the course of justice."⁵ As to the fabrication of evidence, Mrs Justice Steyn noted that the allegation had been made "repeatedly" but concluded that it had "no foundation".⁶

Mrs Justice Steyn succinctly rejected "the contention that [GNM] has perverted or attempted to pervert the course of justice", noting that the "deletion was not in breach of any rule or duty to preserve document[s]", and she held that there "has been no fabrication of evidence".⁷ Mrs Justice Steyn therefore concluded that the "the application to strike out the Amended Defence fails".⁸

Applications to amend the particulars of claim, join additional defendants to the proceedings and for anonymity orders

Mr Clarke applied in January 2025 to re-amend his Particulars of Claim to add a new cause of action in unlawful means conspiracy, as well as claiming special damages in excess of £70m (the "Amendment Application"). Mr Clarke also applied to add six new defendants, including Mr Lewis, to the proceedings (the "Joinder Application").

Mrs Justice Steyn was less than impressed with Mr Clarke's decision not to serve the Joinder Application on the proposed defendants, particularly in circumstances where they would reasonably expect to have an opportunity to respond to the application. Observing that "if the application were to be listed at this stage, it could not fairly be listed until about five or six weeks' time" which "would end up coinciding with the trial",⁹ Mrs Justice Steyn adjourned Mr Clarke's applications until after trial. Of course, if Mr Clarke were to lose at trial, those applications would then naturally fall away.

Mr Clarke appealed.

At the same hearing, GNM applied for anonymity orders in respect of six of its witnesses. Mrs Justice Steyn explained the starting point that "anonymity and reporting restrictions are derogations from open justice" and such "derogations should be no more than what is strictly required to achieve their purposes".¹⁰ Noting that the evidence to be given by these witnesses was in relation to allegations of sexual misconduct and the impact on those witnesses if they were to be named, Mrs Justice Steyn concluded that "the anonymity and reporting restrictions sought are strictly necessary both in order to ensure that the court is able to receive their best evidence and also to protect the article 8 rights to privacy."¹¹

Court of Appeal

On appeal, Mr Clarke advanced three grounds of appeal, but focused on one main ground: that Mrs Justice Steyn was wrong in law to adjourn the hearing of the Amendment Application until after conclusion of the trial and the decision was arrived at in breach of the rules of natural justice, it was illogical, and it would stifle Mr Clarke's legitimate claim in unlawful means conspiracy.

Warby LJ, giving lead judgment for the Court of Appeal, considered that:¹²

"The only realistic options were... (1) to adjourn the trial for many months so that the Amendment Application could be prepared, heard and determined in full and, to the extent it was successful, the substantial further trial preparation necessary could be undertaken; or (2) to adjourn the hearing of the Amendment Application until after the trial, and restrict the scope of the trial to issues of liability for libel and data protection. Nobody was contending for option 1. But that is not the reason why the judge adopted option 2. She conducted an assessment of the prejudice which each option would or might cause and carried out a balancing exercise. She was entitled to conclude, in the terms that she did, that option 1 would cause substantial prejudice to the publisher and third parties. The question then comes down to whether the judge was entitled to conclude that this prejudice coupled with the lateness of the application outweighed any prejudice that the claimant would suffer by reason of the adjournment."

Warby LJ concluded that Mr Clarke "had a full and fair opportunity to address that issue and on the material before her the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that she did."¹³

Application for Specific Disclosure

GNM's disclosure included some 142 audio files, including recordings of telephone calls. Only 60 of those files were provided for inspection, the other 82 files being withheld in order to protect the journalistic sources identifiable in those files (as entitled to do so statutorily).¹⁴ 77 of the audio files were transcribed by an AI program and those were disclosed and provided for inspection, subject to redactions. The AI transcription was not, however, especially accurate in transcribing the audio files. GNM therefore suggested that the parties might benefit from professionally certified transcripts, those transcripts being required for trial in any event. GNM organised those transcripts but Mr Clarke refused to split the costs with GNM, and GNM therefore refused to provide the professionally certified transcripts and asserted litigation privilege over the transcripts.

Mr Clarke issued an application for specific disclosure. Despite holding that a transcript of a non-privileged conversation cannot itself be privileged, Mrs Justice Steyn refused the application for specific disclosure on the basis that there was "virtually no attempt to explain the materiality to the issues of the documents sought" ¹⁵ and an "order requiring [GNM] to disclose all 142 certified transcripts would impose an onerous task on [GNM] at a time when it is heavily engaged in the work required for the trial which has begun."¹⁶

In parallel, Mr Clarke applied for the lifting of various redactions which had been applied to the disclosed transcripts. In relation to that application, Mrs Justice Steyn noted that "the only redactions [GNM] has made in reliance on section 10 are to protect confidential journalistic sources",¹⁷ and she ultimately held that Mr Clarke had not focused on particular documents or redactions to convince her that "the interests of justice exception in section 10 applies".¹⁸ Mrs Justice Steyn therefore concluded that Mr Clarke "plainly failed to convincingly establish that it is necessary to override the important public interest in protection of journalistic sources in the interests of justice"¹⁹ and she refused the application.

Trial

Following a six-week trial, Mrs Justice Steyn considered that GNM's defences of truth and public interest succeeded.

As a preliminary issue, Mrs Justice Steyn considered that GNM did not need to defend its latter seven articles as Mr Clarke had "not properly pleaded the facts and matters on which he relies to satisfy [the serious harm test] in respect of any of the second to eighth articles. Nor did he adduce evidence of the harm attributable to each of those articles."²⁰ The focus of trial was therefore on the first article.

Truth

In relation to GNM's defence of truth, Mrs Justice Steyn considered that Mr Clarke "was not a credible or reliable witness."²¹ In response to witness testimony from some 26 witnesses on behalf of GNM, Mr Clarke claimed that they had "come to court to lie"; Mrs Justice Steyn found that this was "inherently implausible."²²

Mrs Justice Steyn found that the following allegations were true:²³

"i) Preying on/harassing [victim names];

• ii) Bullying behaviour towards [victim names];

iii) Unwanted sexual contact, kissing, touching or groping towards [victim names];

• iv) Sexually inappropriate behaviour and comments...

...

• vi) Covertly filming [victim names]; showing that covert footage to [victim name]; showing explicit photographs to [victim name]; sharing explicit photographs of [victim name] with Mr Fairbanks; sharing footage of [victim name]... and showing explicit photographs of fans to [victim name] – all of which was, or may be inferred to have been, without consent."

Mrs Justice Steyn therefore concluded that the allegations were "more than sufficient to find that the meaning of the first article is substantially true."²⁴ Mrs Justice Steyn also added that "if it is necessary for [GNM] to establish the substantial truth of the other articles (contrary to my conclusions in respect of serious harm), they have done so."²⁵

Public Interest

In relation to GNM's defence of public interest, Mrs Justice Steyn found that "[GNM] has succeeded in establishing that the first article was published on a matter of public interest. [GNM's Editor-in-Chief] made the decision to publish and she honestly believed (along with all of the Guardian's editorial witnesses, as well as the reporters) that publication was in the public interest" and "that belief was undoubtedly reasonable."²⁶

Judgment was therefore entered in favour of GNM.

Trial Consequentials

At a consequential hearing following the dismissal of Mr Clarke's claim, Mr Clarke, who appeared unrepresented, pleaded with Mrs Justice Steyn to take into account his limited means when deciding whether to award GNM any interim costs. Mr Clarke also asked the court to defer payment of interim costs pending an appeal.

Mrs Justice Steyn was undeterred by these submissions and ordered Mr Clarke to pay £3m on account of GNM's costs within 28 days, in respect of an anticipated eventual costs liability in excess of £6m, which GNM described as a conservative estimate of its total costs.

Comment

Libel proceedings are notoriously costly, and these were no exception. With estimated legal costs potentially exceeding £10m, these proceedings underscore the financial risks of pursuing or defending such claims. If Mr Clarke's financial position is as bleak as he avers, the outcome of these proceedings will have serious financial consequences for him, in addition to reputational implications within the performing arts industry.

This case highlights the courts' robust approach to strike-out and disclosure-related applications in the context of defamation claims, as well as the continuing protection afforded to journalistic sources. In particular, the trial judgment reinforces the strength of the truth and public interest defences where responsible journalism on matters of public concern is established.

Footnotes

1. [2023] EWHC 2734 (KB) at [55].

2. [2002] EWCA Civ 1772.

3. [2025] EWHC 180 (KB) at [12].

4. Ibid at [21].

5. [2025] EWHC 222 (KB) at [72].

6. Ibid at [75].

7. Ibid at [77].

8. Ibid at [79].

9. [2025] EWHC 142 (KB) at [15].

10. Ibid at [29].

11. Ibid at [32].

12. [2025] EWCA Civ 164 at [34].

13. Ibid at [35].

14. Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

15. [2025] EWHC 550 (KB) at [25].

16. Ibid at [29].

17. Ibid at [46].

18. Ibid at [56].

19. Ibid at [59].

20. [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB) at [110].

21. Ibid at [128].

22. Ibid at [129].

23. Ibid at [856].

24. Ibid at [857].

25. Ibid at [858].

26. Ibid at [1022].

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