CVA/HTA Practice Group Newsletter

Welcome to the third edition of our Child Victims Act/Human Trafficking & Assault (CVA/HTA) Practice's newsletter.

Below, members of our practice summarize significant news in these areas from the past several months. Major developments include the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding that CPLR 208 (b) - which gives child sexual abuse survivors until age 55 to file a lawsuit - applies only prospectively for claims arising after the Child Victims Act's passage in 2019, and the New York Appellate Division, Second Department's ruling that the Adult Survivors Act (ASA) revived a plaintiff's sexual abuse claims, despite their prior dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Also included in this edition are a comparison of "charitable immunity" doctrines in New York and Maryland and a summary of a $5 million verdict issued in the first CVA trial in New Jersey.

Read on for more details on these developments.

Corey Shulman, Newsletter Editor

Second Circuit Holds CPLR 208(b) Applies Only Prospectively

By Dean Pillarella

In Friedman v. Bartell, No. 24-756-cv, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 14754 (2d Cir. Jun. 16, 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, who failed to interpose his action within CPLR 214-g's revival period, could not utilize CPLR 208(b) to defeat the statute of limitations.

The plaintiff alleged to have been sexually abused in New York in 1982, and brought intentional tort and negligence claims against the defendant, his alleged abuser, after CPLR 214-g's revival period expired. The defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired, and the district court granted the motion.

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding the plaintiff could not rely upon CPLR 214-g because its revival window closed five months before he filed suit. The plaintiff argued that CPLR 208(b) allowed him through age 55 to file his action and that because he was less than 55 at the time of commencement, the action was timely. The Second Circuit rejected this argument too, holding CPLR 208(b) "applies only prospectively, after the enactment of the CVA, and is thus inapplicable to [] claims[] which accrued before the enactment of the CVA." Friedman at *3-4. In support, the panel cited the New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department's decision in DiSalvo v. Wayland-Cohocton Cent. Sch. Dist., 218 A.D.3d 1169 (4th Dep't 2023). There, the appellate panel rejected the notion that CPLR 208(b)'s age restriction also extended to CPLR 214-g and noted, "the CVA amended CPLR 208(b) to prospectively and permanently allow victims of child sexual abuse to pursue those claims until age 55, whereas CPLR 214-g was enacted to provide temporary retrospective relief for all claims—regardless of age—for a limited and discrete period of time."

Friedman illustrates that plaintiffs who failed to interpose previously time-barred claims within CPLR 214-g's revival period cannot utilize CPLR 208(b) to defeat the statute of limitations—even if under age 55. To date, however, a state appellate court has yet to follow Friedman. As such, it remains to be seen whether Friedman will also become the law in the courts of the First, Second, and Third Departments.

Second Department Holds CPLR 214-j Revives Causes of Action Previously Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

By Dean Pillarella

In Esposito v. Isaac, 240 A.D.3d 750 (2d Dep't 2025), the New York Appellate Division, Second Department held that the Adult Survivors Act ("ASA") revived the plaintiff's sexual abuse claims, despite their prior dismissal in 2009 for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant sexually assaulted her in 2005 and commenced suit in 2006. The trial court dismissed the 2006 suit, as the plaintiff failed to serve the defendant with the summons and complaint within the 120-day requirement under CPLR 306-b. The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed dismissal of the 2006 action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon the passage of the ASA, however, the plaintiff commenced a successor action against the defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was time-barred and that CPLR 214-j provided no revival. The trial court granted the defendant's motion.

Interestingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court and reinstated the complaint, holding, in pertinent part, that CPLR 214-j "contains no prohibition against reviving the plaintiff's causes of action under the circumstances presented." Rather, the "plain language of CPLR 214-j provides that it revives 'every civil claim or cause of action' alleging the subject conduct 'which is barred ... because the applicable period of limitation has expired.'" Esposito, 240 A.D.3d at 751 (emphasis in original). The word "every" "imports no limitation and evidences the Legislature's intent for revival to apply to all claims and causes of action that would otherwise be barred on statute of limitations grounds." Id. at 751-752. Thus, because the plaintiff's claims would be time-barred but for the ASA, CPLR 214-j revived the plaintiff's claims, irrespective of the dismissal of the prior action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Esposito demonstrates the breadth of the ASA's and CVA's revival statutes. Because the statutes revived "every" claim previously barred because the statute of limitations has expired, a dismissal of a prior action for lack of personal jurisdiction (or dismissal otherwise not on the merits) is no impediment to revival.

A Comparison of Charitable Immunity: New York vs. Maryland

By Corey Shulman

Charitable immunity originated as a common law doctrine to provide nonprofit charitable organizations immunity from suit. While most states have partially codified charitable immunity protections (such as damages caps, specific activities, or protection of individual volunteers), New York and Maryland stand on opposite ends of the spectrum; New York does not recognize charitable immunity, while Maryland recognizes a very robust application.

The case of McGuire v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 2025 NY Slip Op 05154 (1st Dept. Sept. 25, 2025) is a recent example of New York's refusal to recognize charitable immunity, particularly in the context of Child Victims Act ("CVA") litigation. In McGuire, the plaintiff alleged he was sexually abused by defendant's priests in the 1970s during several trips from Massachusetts to New York. The defendant moved for dismissal, partly arguing it was entitled to the benefit of Massachusetts' now-abolished Doctrine of Charitable Immunity, which was in effect during the alleged abuse. While the Court recognized its viability during the alleged abuse, it declined to afford the defendant charitable immunity, holding "application of that doctrine would be repugnant to the New York State public policy of providing sexually abused minors with an opportunity to seek justice, as explicitly codified in CPLR 214-g..."

Conversely, the case of Schappelle v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, C-15-CV-23-003696 (Montgomery County Circuit Court, July 21, 2025) exemplifies Maryland's unwavering application of charitable immunity. In Schappelle, the plaintiff alleged he was sexually abused by the defendant's priest in 1986/1987. Notwithstanding the allegations and the purpose of Maryland's CVA statute, the court dismissed the complaint as to the defendant, holding it established entitlement to charitable immunity. Specifically, the defendant established (1) its predominant character is charitable; (2) its assets are held in trust; and (3) it has no liability insurance covering the allegations. The plaintiff argued that the CVA implicitly abrogated charitable immunity, much for the reasons set forth in McGuire. The court rejected the argument, holding "The CVA removed all time bars to child sex abuse claims. The legislature understood that both governmental units and Catholic churches would be liable under the CVA. Yet, notably, the legislature expressed addressed sovereign immunity and no reference was made to charitable immunity...The legislature knows how to remove, limit, or expand charitable immunity when they wish to. The CVA did not address charitable immunity in any manner" (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Maryland's plaintiff bar plans to appeal this decision and continues to argue that Maryland's CVA abrogated charitable immunity. Until a Maryland appellate court reverses this decision or the Maryland legislature abolishes charitable immunity, defendants should continue to assert charitable immunity as an affirmative defense to preserve the right to move for dismissal and/or summary judgment. This is especially critical in the event the legislature prospectively abolishes charitable immunity, but leaves retroactive application intact.

Plaintiff Secures $5 Million Verdict in New Jersey's First CVA Trial

On October 8, 2025, a jury in Morris County, New York awarded a plaintiff $5 million in compensatory damages in what is the first CVA case to reach a verdict in New Jersey. The plaintiff, known as "T.S." alleged he was sexually abused by Father Richard Lott, a member of the Order of Saint Benedict, on New Year's Eve 1975 at the Benedictine-run Delbarton School in Morristown, New Jersey. Following a nearly five-week trial, the jury determined the Order of Saint Benedict was 65% liable for the plaintiff's pain and suffering, while apportioning 35% liability to Fr. Lott (now known as Edward Lott). Critically, plaintiff introduced deposition testimony from the now-deceased Benedictine Abott Brian Clarke, who admitted that plaintiff wrote him a letter after graduation detailing the abuse, but that Abbot Clarke intentionally destroyed the letter.

The week after issuing the $5 million compensatory damages award, the jury declined to award any punitive damages to the plaintiff. It remains to be seen whether the Order of Saint Benedict plans to appeal the verdict, as the jury unanimously determined that the Delbarton School and St. Mary's Abbey (its connected monastery) did not violate New Jersey's Child Sex Abuse Act, yet imposed a significant verdict.